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Abstract
Since trust correlates with economic development and in turn economic development associates with political regime, we conjecture 
that there may be a relationship between trust and political regime. Without looking for any casual inference, we investigate if trust 
aggregated	on	the	country	level	correlates	with	the	country's	political	regime.	Specifically,	we	are	interested	whether	trust	correlates	
positively with the level of democracy in cross-sectional observations. We analyse data on trust from 76 countries using the Global 
Preference	Survey	and	investigate	the	correlations	with	five	separate	democracy	indices	(Polity2,	Economist	Intelligence	Unit’s	Index	
of	Democracy,	Freedom	House,	MaxRange	and	Unified	Democracy	Score).	We	do	not	find	any	significant	association,	with	or	without	
taking into account other factors (e.g., regional location, economic development, geographic conditions, culture) as well. Trust does 
not	correlate	with	cornerstones	of	democracy	either,	measured	by	five	components	of	the	EIU	index.	A	robustness	check	using	an	
alternative measure of trust from the World Values Survey reaches the same results. The present study supersedes the working paper 
version (Khayouti et al., 2020).
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1 Introduction
Simmel (1950:p.326) claims that "trust is one of the 
most important synthetic forces within society". A tes-
tament to this statement is the empirical finding that 
trust associates with economic development. Knack and 
Keefer (1997), Whiteley (2000), Dincer and Uslaner (2010) 
and Beugelsdijk et al. (2004) provide evidence on the cor-
relation between trust and national income (or economic 
growth), while Algan and Cahuc (2010) show that the rela-
tionship is causal. Regarding the mechanisms behind the 
previous findings, Zak and Knack (2001) offer theoretical 
and empirical support that trust affects the rate of invest-
ment, while Bjørnskov (2012) documents the effect of 
trust on schooling and the rule of law. 
On the other hand, Acemoglu et al. (2019) claim that 
democracy has a significant positive effect on income. 
Weede (1996) suggests that the variance in growth rates 
is larger among autocracies than among democracies. 
Leblang (1996) claims that the political regime affects 
economic development indirectly through its commitment 
to property right. 
If trust associates positively with economic development 
and at the same time political regime has a relationship 
with national income, then one may suspect that on average 
trust is higher in more democratic countries. In fact, many 
scholars have argued that trust is one of the main elements 
of social capital that in turn is necessary to have social 
integration, economic efficiency and democratic stability 
(Arrow, 1972; Coleman, 1988; Gambetta, 1988; Ostrom, 
1990; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000; Newton, 2001). 
Moreover, there are theories that suggest that democ-
racy has an advantage in generating trust relative to 
non-democracies due to several reasons. For instance, 
Sztompka (1997) lists seven conditions that enhance trust 
in society and that are generally present in democracies, 
but often absent in non-democracies. The overarching 
theme behind the conditions is that they insure the citizens 
against potential breaches of trust, and they include the 
transparency of social organisations, the stability of social 
order, the accountability of power and the enforcement of 
duties and responsibilities, among others. In this study, we 
examine empirically if democracies indeed exhibit higher 
levels of trust, without focusing on any concrete channel 
through which the two are related. We briefly examine also 
if trust associates with specific elements of democracy.
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Rainer and Siedler (2009) is the study that is clos-
est to ours. They show that shortly after reunification 
East Germans were significantly less trusting than their 
Western counterparts, suggesting that political regime 
and trust are associated. However, interestingly decades 
of democracy were not able to close the trust gap. They 
show that economic hardships explain why trust levels 
in the former East Germany did not converge to those in 
the West. We have data on trust, political regime and eco-
nomic development for 76 countries that allow us to see:
1. if there is an association between political regime 
and trust, and
2. if economic development is behind the previous 
association (if there is any).
2 Data
Trust does not have a precise definition. It is often used 
as an umbrella term that includes a set of positive values 
as reciprocity, civility, respect, solidarity, or empathy. 
However, in surveys standard questions emerged to mea-
sure trust. An example is Falk et al. (2018) who measured 
several preferences worldwide, among them trust. More 
concretely, in their Global Preferences Survey respondents 
were asked if they assume that other people only have 
the best intentions (Likert scale, 0–10). This trust mea-
sure was validated (Falk et al., 2016), predicting trusting 
behaviour in incentivised trust games. We use this global 
trust survey and link it to measures of political regime.
We take five widely used indices of political regime 
for 2012 (the year that the Global Preference Survey was 
executed) that are freely available. The Polity2 dataset 
(Marshall et al., 2013) assigns to each country a score rang-
ing from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated 
democracy). The EIU Democracy Index (Kekic, 2007) 
considers five dimensions of political regime (e.g., civil lib-
erties and political participation) and combines the scores 
in each dimension into a final one that ranges between 0 
and 10. The Freedom House's (FH) Freedom in the World 
index (Puddington, 2012) assigns 0–4 points to 25 separate 
indicators (e.g. political rights, civil liberties), yielding an 
aggregate score per country ranging between 0 and 100. 
The MaxRange (MR) dataset (Rånge et al., 2015) is based 
on seven main criteria (e.g. political competition, electoral 
integrity and quality) resulting in an index that goes from 
0 to 100. The Unified Democracy Score (UDS) (Pemstein 
et al., 2017) combines 10 existing indices using a Bayesian 
latent variable approach in a way that it is at least as reliable 
as the most reliable component measure. 
We use different political regime indices because there 
is no consensual list with all the desired features that a full-
fledged democracy should have. Hence, there is no perfect 
political regime index and a way to deal with this issue is 
to consider several such indices. We standardise these mea-
sures for our analysis, so that they can be compared intui-
tively without being influenced by their different ranges and 
averages. Pairwise correlation between the indices that we 
use ranges from 0.723 (MR vs. EIU) to 0.969 (EIU vs. UDS), 
all of them being significant at the 1% significance level.
3 Findings
Fig. 1 depicts the simple association between the Polity2 
index and trust, while Fig. 2 contains the coefficient plots 
that also take into account other factors. Using other indices 
does not change the overall picture. The magnitude of cor-
relation varies between −0.0297 (UDS) and −0.2286 (MR) 
and is significant only for MR at the 5% significance level. 
Hence, most of the correlations fail to be significant, more-
over all of them have a negative sign, contrary to our expec-
tation. In Appendix A, we report the same figure with the 
other political regime indices (see Fig. 3–6 in Appendix A).
To gain a better insight, we carry out stepwise OLS 
regression analyses for each political regime index. The 
same regressions are run consistently, and we use coeffi-
cient plots to represent the results in a parsimonious way. 
Thick/thin lines indicate the confidence intervals of the 
effects at the 10/5% significance levels. 
The dependent variable is always trust, aggregated on 
country level. Our first specification has only the given 
Fig. 1 The association between trust and the EIU democracy index (no 
additional controls added)
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political regime index (converted to a 0-1 scale, higher 
values indicating more democracy) as regressor. Next, 
we add regional dummies as Falk et al. (2018) document 
regional disparities in trust. Subsequently, we also con-
trol for economic performance using GDP per capita (PPP) 
and unemployment rate, as economic development may be 
correlated both with trust and political regime. The fourth 
specification adds controls related to geographical condi-
tions (average temperature, average precipitation, and dis-
tance to Equator) taken from Falk et al. (2018) as that study 
reports an association between these factors and trust. For 
the same reason, we also include controls for culture in the 
last specification, captured by the share of different reli-
gions in the population (based on data obtained from the 
Pew Research Center website).  
As Fig. 2 indicates, contrary to our expectation all coef-
ficients are negative and generally are insignificant. More 
concretely, 3 of our 5 indices (EIU, FH and UDS) fail to 
exhibit even marginal significance in any of the specifi-
cations, Polity2 is marginally significant in one specifi-
cation, while the MaxRange score is at least marginally 
significant in 4 of our 5 specifications. Importantly, in 
the most comprehensive specification none of the indices 
proves to be significant. We carry another analysis. The 
EIU index has five categories (electoral process and plu-
ralism, functioning of government, political participation, 
political culture, civil liberties) for which scores are pub-
lished. We run the same regressions as before to see if any 
of those categories associates with trust. We fail to see any 
consistent pattern, see Fig. 7 in Appendix B. 
Overall, the data that we study suggest that trust and 
political regime do not associate. The question asked in 
the Global Preference Survey differs from the more widely 
used question in the World Value Survey ("Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, 
or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"), 
so one may wonder if this difference on how trust is mea-
sured affects the findings. Therefore, we carried out a 
robustness check and used the available data from wave 
6 of the World Value Survey. In Appendix C, we present 
the findings of this robustness check that reaches the same 
conclusion (Fig. 8 in Appendix C).
4 Conclusion
Even though the extant literature – and our intuition – 
suggests a positive correlation between trust and the 
level of democracy, we fail to find such association using 
the worldwide trust survey by Falk et al. (2018) and 
well-known political regime indices, such as the score 
of democracy from the Polity2 dataset, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy, the Freedom 
House's democracy index, MaxRange democracy score 
and Unified Democracy Score. The result does not change 
qualitatively, even if we take into account a wide range of 
controls (regions of the world, per capita GDP, tempera-
ture, precipitation, distance to equator and percentages of 
Fig. 2 Association between trust and political regime without and with controls, coefficient plots
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religion adherents). Moreover, if we investigate whether 
trust associates with elements of democracy, we are still 
unable to establish firm relationships. A robustness check 
has been conducted using a measure of trust from the 
World Values Survey, yet still the results contradict the 
assumption of positive relationship between trust and 
democracy. Further research is therefore needed, using 
various measures of trust, and exploring not only the 
correlation but the causal relationship between trust and 
political regime.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix we represent the scatterplots between the political regime indices and trust. 
Fig. 3 The association between trust and the Polity2 democracy index 
(no additional controls added)
Fig. 4 The association between trust and the Freedom House democracy 
index (no additional controls added)
Fig. 5 The association between trust and the Max Range democracy 
index (no additional controls added)
Fig. 6 The association between trust and the Unified Democracy Score 
democracy index (no additional controls added)
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Appendix B
In this Appendix, we run the same regressions as for Fig. 2, but not for different political regime indices. Here our aim is 
to see if building blocks of the EIU Democracy index associate with trust.
Appendix C
In this Appendix, we present a robustness check for the aforementioned results. We run similar regressions as for Fig. 2 
limiting our attention to the specification without controls and specifications that contain variables related to economic 
development. We use the question on trust from the World Value Survey "Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?".
The coefficients of trust are generally insignificant (in line with Fig. 2). It is important to note, however, that there are 
available data only for 59 countries that may affect the precision of the estimates and present potential issues of selection.
Fig. 7 Association between trust and components of the EIU index, coefficient plots
Fig. 8 Association between trust measured in the WVS and political regime without and with controls, coefficient plots
